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NOTES
The Religion Clauses and NLRB
Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools
I. Introduction
Recently, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) granted jurisdiction
over lay parochial school teachers.' This assertion of jurisdiction prompted
religious authorities to challenge the Board's action in the federal courts. In
Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB,2 the bishop refused to bargain with a faculty union
after the Board had claimed jurisdiction. The NLRB found an unfair labor
practice in the bishop's refusal to bargain.3 An appeal of the Board's findings
brought the challenge to NLRB jurisdiction over parochial schools to the
Seventh Circuit. Caulfield v. Hirsh4 raised the same issue in a different manner.
An injunction was sought in Hirsh to prevent the NLRB from conducting a
representation election among lay elementary school teachers.'
In Bishop of Chicago and Hirsh, the application of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA)" to parochial schools was held to violate the first amend-
ment.' Both courts used similar reasoning. They maintained that the collective
bargaining sanctioned by the Act would deprive the bishop of ultimate authority
over school policy.8 Since the effect of the LMRA produced shared decision-
making, the courts found that the Act violated the free exercise clause.' They
also considered the relationship that the LMRA would require between the
NLRB and the schools. The courts concluded that this relationship would
entangle a state agency with a religious organization in violation of the establish-
ment clause.'"
The NLRB position in these cases, of course, disputed the conclusions
reached by the courts. The Board, in Bishop of Chicago, characterized the
LMRA as a general law embodying a legitimate state interest, the stabilization
of labor relations. The NLRB further argued that any infringement of free
exercise of religion resulting from the application of the Act caused only an
incidental burden on this right. This sort of burden, the Board claimed, has
traditionally been understood not to violate the first amendment." In regard to
the establishment issue, the NLRB maintained without elaboration that it would
1 Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976); The Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. 359 (1975); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore,
216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975).
2 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978).
3 The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1223 (1976).
4 95 L.R.R.M. 316+ (1977).
5 Contra, Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5 "(7th Cir. 1977) (injunction preventing NLRB
from conducting representation elections and processing unfair labor practices against the
bishop vacated because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction).
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1970 & Supp. IV 1975).
7 559 F.2d at 1130; 95 L.R.R.M. at 3180..
8 559 F.2d at 1123-24; 95 L.R.R.M. at 3175-80.
9 559 F.2d at 1130; 95 L.R.R.M. at 3178.
10 559 F.2d at 1128-29; 95 L.R.R.M. at 3178-79.
11 224 N.L.R.B. at 1222.
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"accommodate" the religious nature of the schools in its proceedings. The Board
contended that this "accommodation" respected the neutrality toward religion
required by the establishment clause.12
Several distinct interests lie interwoven between the positions of the courts
and the NLRB. On the one hand, the religious authorities seek to preserve their
control over school policy. This interest is protected by their constitutional right
to free exercise of religion. On the other hand, the lay teachers want to obtain
the rights bestowed by the LMRA. These rights would enable the teachers to
bargain collectively for higher salaries and better working conditions. Apart
from the conflicting interests of school authorities and lay teachers lie the purely
constitutional interests that limit the power of the state. These interests are em-
bodied in the first amendment clauses protecting free exercise and prohibiting
establishment of religion.
A complete evaluation of the positions taken by the courts and the NLRB
must deal with these three interwoven interests. This task requires an examina-
tion of three topics: 1) the development of NLRB jurisdiction over nonprofit
religious, charitable, and educational institutions, 2) religion clauses doctrine,
and 3) the controlling principles of unfair labor practice law. These areas of
constitutional and labor law put the issues raised into a legal perspective and
provide an opportunity to appraise the relative merits of the rights concerned.
II. The Development of NLRB Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools
A. The Origins and Scope of the NLRB
The NLRB was created in 1935 by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)." The NLRA was enacted to promote the stabilization of labor rela-
tions and to counteract the inferior bargaining position of individual employees
with respect to that of employers. 4 To fulfill these purposes, the NLRA granted
employees the right to unionize and to bargain collectively.'" The Act, further-
more, made antiunion activities by employers illegal as unfair labor practices.'
In 1947, the NLRA was subsumed by the LMRA. The latter Act added unfair
labor practices by labor organizations to the original prohibitions. 7
The statutory grant of jurisdiction to the NLRB extends to all disputes
"affecting commerce.""8 Judicial interpretation has given the Board jurisdic-
tional authority to the full extent of Congressional dominion under the com-
merce clause. 9 In view of the Supreme Court's expansive view of commerce, the
12 559 F.2d at 1128.
13 National Labor Relations Act, Ch. 372, §§ 1-13, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1970 & Supp. IV 1975)).
14 Id. § 1.
15 Id. §7.
16 Id. §8.
17 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975).
18 Id. §§ 159(c), 160(a).
19 NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1938) (Act applicable to an employer whose
own business involved no interstate commerce but which was engaged in processing materials
shipped to and from the employer by foreign customers); NLRB v. Jones & McLaughlin
Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1937) (NLRA applied to a single, local plant of a vertically




NLRB possesses theoretical jurisdiction that is virtually unlimited in scope." The
Court has also determined that the responsibility to adapt the LMRA to changing
patterns of industrial life belongs to the Board. The judiciary may only exercise
"limited judicial review" as to whether the Board's determinations run contrary
to the language or tenor of the Act.2 The NLRB, however, has never fully
exercised its statutory jurisdiction. Rather, it has adhered to self-imposed re-
strictions. Most of these jurisdictional limitations relate to the employer's gross
revenue or level of out-of-state purchases and sales.22 These prudential restric-
tions combined with the Board's case-by-case approach to jurisdictional questions
provide the historical basis for its assertion of jurisdiction over the parochial
schools.2"
B. The Historical Development of NLRB
Jurisdiction Over Nonprofit Organizations
From the passage of the NLRA to the enactment of the LMRA, the NLRB
asserted jurisdiction over nonprofit charitable and religious employers. The
NLRA defined "employer" without reference to nonprofit charitable, religious,
or educational organizations.24 The Board's claim of jurisdiction depended upon
its case-by-case determination whether the employer's operations affected com-
merce. Prior to 1947, the NLRB thus maintained jurisdiction over a fraternal
organization's insurance operations,2 5 a professional organization's publishing
concerns," a church-operated publishing house,2" and a charitable hospital.2"
The evolution of NLRB jurisdiction was significantly altered by the events
surrounding the passage of the LMRA. The original House bill exempted organ-
izations "operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals."29
The final draft of the bill enacted by Congress, however, exempted only non-
profit hospitals.'" Following the enactment of the LMRA, the NLRB revised its
20 See generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Court held that Congress
had ample basis upon which to find that racial discrimination at restaurants which receive a
substantial portion of their supplies from out of state impose a burden of national magnitude
on commerce).
21 NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266-67 (1970).
22 29 C.F.R. §§ 103.1 to 103.3 (1977).
23 For an in-depth historical analysis of the growth of NLRB jurisdiction over nonprofit
charitable, religious and educational institutions, see Serritella, The National Labor Relations
Board and Nonprofit Charitable, Educational and Religious Institutions, 21 CAT. LAw. 322
(1975); Sherman & Black, The Labor Board and the Private Nonprofit Employer: A
Critical Evaluation of the Board's Worthy Cause Exemption, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1323 "(1970);
Note, 1974 Amendments to Labor Management Relations Act-Charitable Institution Exemp-
tion Eliminated, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 1143 (1977).
24 Ch. 372 § 2, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1970 & Supp.
IV 1975)).
25 Polish Nat'l Alliance, 42 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1942), enforced as modified, 136 F.2d
175 (7th Cir. 1943), aff'd, 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
26 American Medical Ass'n, 39 N.L.R.B. 385 (1942).
27 Christian Bd. of Publication, 13 N.L.R.B. 534 (1939), enforced, 113 F.2d 678 (8th
Cir. 1940).
28 Cent. Dispensary and Emergency Hosp., 44 N.L.R.B. 533 (1942), enforced, 145
F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945).
29 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1947).
30 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970) (amended 1974).
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jurisdictional policy. The new policy was stated in Board of Trustees of Colum-
bia University,"' in which the Board created a "worthy cause" exemption. The
NLRB relied on the House Minority Report to the original bill in articulating
the reasons for the change. The Report maintained that the Board had asserted
jurisdiction over nonprofit entities only in "exceptional circumstances and in con-
nection with [their] purely commercial activities."32 Thus, after the passage of
the LMRA, the Board refused to assert jurisdiction over a private university, 3
a church-operated radio station,"4 a YMCA,3  a research institute," a nonprofit
book exchange,"7 and a nonprofit symphony orchestra."
Not all nonprofit entities, however, were exempted by the Board from its
jurisdiction after the passage of the LMRA. The NLRB asserted jurisdiction
over nonprofit organizations when it found their operations "purely com-
mercial" in nature. 9 In practice, however, the Board looked to the profit-making
or nonprofit purposes of the employer. It failed to consider the nature of the work
performed by the employees seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the NLRB.4
For example, the Board claimed jurisdiction over a nonprofit research institute
with no university affiliation ;41 whereas, it declined jurisdiction over several
similar institutes connected with universities.4"
In the 1970 case of Cornell University,4 the NLRB reached a turning
point in its jurisdictional decisions concerning nonprofit entities. The Board
abolished its policy of declining jurisdiction over nonprofit institutions of higher
education as a class, expressly overruling Trustees of Columbia University.44 The
NLRB did not establish a dollar-volume standard for asserting jurisdiction over
institutions of higher education. Rather, the Board maintained that the institu-
tions before it, Cornell and Syracuse universities, unquestionably affected com-
merce. 45 After Cornell, the NLRB issued an administrative rule limiting its
jurisdiction over this class to those institutions with gross annual revenues exceed-
ing one million dollars.4"
The exception for institutions of higher education to the "worthy cause"
exemption created by Cornell developed into a trend. First, it was extended to
31 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
32 H. CONF. RaP. No. 510, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 32 (1947).
33 Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
34 Lutheran Church Mo. Synod, 109 N.L.R.B. 859 (1954).
35 YMCA of Portland, Or., 146 N.L.R.B. 20 (1964).
36 Univ. of Miami, Inst. of Marine Science Div., 146 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1964).
37 United States Book Exch., 167 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1967).
38 Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n, 97 N.L.R.B. 548 (1951).
39 Drexel Home, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1970) (home for the aged); Sunday School Bd.
of S. Baptist Convention, 92 N.L.R.B. 801 (1950) (church-owned publishing house of religious
literature); Port Arthur College, 92 N.L.R.B. 152 (1950) (commercial radio station operated
by an educational institution).
40 Sherman & Black, supra note 23, at 1339-43.
41 Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst., 143 N.L.R.B. 568 (1963).
42 Univ. of Miami, Inst. of Marine Science Div., 146 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1964). See also
Mass. Inst. of Technology (Computation Center), 152 N.L.R.B. 598 (1965); Leland Stanford
Jr. Univ., 152 N.L.R.B. 704 (1965).
43 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
44 Id. at 334. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
45 The uncontested facts in Cornell stated that Syracuse University's annual operating
budget amounted to $66 million, including out of state purchases of $5 million. Similarly,
Cornell University's annual expenditures were fixed at $142,300,000. 183 N.L.R.B. at 331.
46 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1977).
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secondary schools, both nonprofit" and proprietary. The NLRB refused, how-
ever, to assert jurisdiction over two nonprofit religious educational organiza-
tions."9 In both cases the schools taught only ecclesiastical subjects. Neither
institution conferred the equivalent of a secular academic degree upon the com-
pletion of its curriculum alone. The Board declined jurisdiction based on the
completely religious nature of each organization."
Beyond the completely religious criterion, the NLRB has implemented the
governmental nexus test to preclude the assertion of its jurisdiction over educa-
tional institutions. Where the employer and the state were closely related through
public financing, the Board declined jurisdiction.5 It developed this test because
the LMRA explicitly excludes national and state governments and their political
subdivisions from the NLRB's jurisdiction.52
In the context of this evolution, the NLRB considered the question of
Board jurisdiction over parochial secondary schools. 3 The Board distinguished
these institutions from completely religious organizations, because the schools
were fully accredited to confer the equivalent of a secular academic degree. 4
The NLRB also maintained that the LMRA did not support or interfere with
religious beliefs. 5 Having made these determinations, the Board used the same
jurisdictional standard applicable to other private educational institutions. Thus,
it granted jurisdiction over parochial secondary schools.5"
From a historical perspective, therefore, two events have played a significant
role in the NLRB's jurisdictional policies. First, the passage of the LMRA
marked the beginning of the "worthy cause" exemption and the NLRB's denial
of jurisdiction over most nonprofit entities. Second, the Cornell decision initiated
the erosion of that exemption and began the Board's assertion of jurisdiction
over most nonprofit organizations. The exemption remains intact for educational
institutions characterized by the NLRB as completely religious. It may also still
exist for organizations where the employer is primarily financed by the govern-
ment. Beyond these exceptions, however, the Board uses a single jurisdictional
47 Shattuck School, 189 N.L.R.B. 886 (1971).
48 Windsor School, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 991 (1972).
49 Bd. of Jewish Educ. of Greater Washington D.C., 210 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1974); Ass'n
of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1974).
50 The NLRB also began to abandon the "worthy cause" exemption in its dealings with
other nonprofit entities. The Board granted jurisdiction over two nonprofit child care centers
in The Children's Village, 186 N.L.R.B. 953 (1970) and Jewish Orphan's Home of Southern
California, 191 N.L.R.B. 32 (1971). The NLRB reversed its position concerning its jurisdic-
tion over nonprofit charitable child care centers in 1974. Mission of Our Lady of Mercy, 212
N.L.R.B. 855 (1974); Crotched Mountain Foundation, 212 N.L.R.B. 420 (1974); West
Oakland Home, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 755 (1974); Ming Quong Children's Center, 210
N.L.R.B. 899 (1974). The Board, however, has subsequently overruled its 1974 jurisdictional
policy regarding nonprofit charitable child care centers. In Rhode Island Catholic Orphan
Asylum, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1976), the NLRB adopted a single jurisdictional standard for
both charitable and profit-making employers.
51 Howard Univ., 211 N.L.R.B. 247 (1974); Temple Univ., 194 N.L.R.B. 1160
(1972). But see Lutheran Welfare Services of Ill., 216 N.L.R.B. 518 (1975)
(Board jurisdiction asserted, despite the fact that the educational and custodial services were
funded by the Model Cities Program).
52 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975).
53 See note 1 supra.
54 216 N.L.R.B. at 250.
55 223 N.L.R.B. at 1218; 220 N.L.R.B. at 359.
56 223 N.L.R.B. at 1221; 220 N.L.R.B. at 360; 216 N.L.R.B. at 251.
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standard over profit-making and nonprofit employers alike.
The NLRB applied both the completely religious and the governmental
nexus tests in deciding to assert jurisdiction over parochial schools. The Board
held that none of the schools fell within the completely religious exemption. 7
It also found that the employers were not primarily financed by national, state,
or local governments.5" In addition, as previously noted, the NLRB maintained
that the provisions of the LMRA neither supported nor interfered with religious
beliefs. The Board's assessment of these three factors combined with its private
school precedents determined the outcome of its single jurisdictional standard
test. Since it had already granted jurisdiction over private secondary educational
institutions, 9 the Board asserted jurisdiction over the parochial schools. In so
doing, it had applied its criteria consistently.
III. The Judicial Response to NLRB Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools
Notwithstanding the NLRB's faithful application of its jurisdictional
standards, the courts voided its assertion of jurisdiction over parochial schools.
The Seventh Circuit in Bishop of Chicago directly overruled the Board's decision."
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Hirsh enjoined the
NLRB from conducting a representation election. 1 The rationale of both courts
followed substantially the same line of reasoning. Consequently, an examination
of the judicial response to NLRB jurisdiction need only focus on one of these
opinions. For this purpose, the Seventh Circuit's decision is discussed, because it
furnishes both the more fully articulated opinion and the higher judicial author-
ity.
In Bishop of Chicago, the court recognized that the LMRA applied to
private educational institutions. 2 It narrowly defined the issue to "whether the
Board's exercise of jurisdiction over the [parochial] schools constitute[d] an
improper breaching of the separation wall [between church and state] provided
by the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment."6 In holding that NLRB
jurisdiction over these schools violated the first amendment, 4 the Seventh Circuit
found infractions of both religion clauses.
The court discussed two areas concerning the right to free exercise of
religion. The first question involved the Board's threshold determination of the
completely religious or religiously associated nature of an institution. The
Seventh Circuit maintained that the resolution of this inquiry would necessarily
require the NLRB to measure the religiosity of each school.6" This sort of ex-
amination, the court concluded, was beyond the Board's discretion as a matter of
constitutional doctrine.6
57 223 N.L.R.B. at 1218; 220 N.L.R.B. at 359; 216 N.L.R.B. at 250.
58 223 N.L.R.B. at 1219; 220 N.L.R.B. at 360; 216 N.L.R.B. at 250.
59 See notes 47-48 supra.
60 559 F.2d at 1130.
61 95 L.R.R.M. at 3180.
62 559 F.2d at 1115.
63 Id. at 1118.
64 Id. at 1130.
65 Id. at 1120.
66 Id. at 1120-23.
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The NLRB contended in Bishop of Chicago that the invalidation of the
threshold question would require it to assert jurisdiction over all religious
schools.6" The Board's position compelled the Seventh Circuit to reach the
second free exercise of religion concern. This matter involved the impact of
faculty unionization upon the bishop's authority over school policy. The court
maintained that the act of union certification would alter and infringe upon the
religious character of parochial schools. It argued that the bishop would be
forced to share decision-making authority with union representatives regarding
employment terms. The Seventh Circuit then contended that collective bargain-
ing would result in the conversion of academic policy to conditions of employ-
ment. This consequence, it concluded, would impair the bishop's authority to
maintain parochial schools in accordance with ecclesiastical concerns. 8
Beyond the free exercise implications, the Seventh Circuit raised establish-
ment objections regarding the application of the LMRA to parochial schools. It
posed a hypothetical situation involving the discharge of a lay teacher.69 The
court postulated that the employee could allege that he had been fired because of
his union activity. On the other hand, the employer could charge that the
instructor taught heresy. The court argued that the NLRB would have either
to determine the validity of the heresy charge, an ecclesiastical matter, or to
accept and enforce the opinion of the religious hierarchy. In the former situation,
the Board would infringe on the bishop's free exercise of religion." In the latter
circumstance, the NLRB would violate the establishment clause by binding the
parties to the decision of ecclesiastical authority.7 The Seventh Circuit thus held
that no "accommodation" of the religious character of the schools by the NLRB
could withstand first amendment scrutiny.
72
IV. Religion Clauses Doctrine
A controversy regarding the constitutionality of applying the LMRA to
lay teachers thus exists. Both the NLRB and the courts have based their positions
upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of the first amendment religion clauses.
Three distinct contexts have provided the Court with religion clauses issues: 1)
state funded aid to parochial schools, 2) the interaction of the religion clauses
with compelling state interests, and 3) civil court involvement with ecclesiastical
disputes. A complete evaluation of the applicability of the LMRA to parochial
schools requires an analysis of all three contexts. Only this sort of analysis can
examine the issue in the full context of the religion clauses.
A. The Financial Aid Principles
The Supreme Court has held in its parochaid decisions that the Constitu-
67 Id. at 1123.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1125.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1128.
72 Id. at 1130.
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tion requires states to maintain strict neutrality toward religion.73 As the Court
explained in Walz v. Tax Commissioner,71 this doctrine demands that "no re-
ligion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited." To
achieve the requisite neutrality, the state must confine its activities to secular tasks
and avoid aiding religious activities. The state and religious authorities, more-
over, must remain separate."
The parochaid cases have produced a three-prong test as a result of the
cumulative effect of implementing the neutrality doctrine." First, the Court
must look at the legislation. An act can survive constitutional scrutiny if its pur-
pose is secular.7 Second, the primary effect of the legislation can neither advance
nor inhibit religion.7 ' Third, the statute cannot foster excessive entanglements
between the state and religion. 9
The doctrine of neutrality and the resultant three-prong test have evolved
to protect religious freedom as embodied in the first amendment. In terms of the
free exercise clause, they oppose state action infringing upon the absolute
freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions."0 The impact of neutrality and the
three-prong test in regard to the establishment clause, however, cannot be defined
as clearly. A law may respect the establishment of a religion without promoting
a state religion."' Additionally, legislation bestowing equal benefits to all religions
also raises establishment implications.8 2 Yet not every law furnishing "indirect,"
"remote," or "incidental" benefits upon religion fails to satisfy the constitutional
requirement.8" The establishment clause resists three main evils: sponsorship,
73 See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1976) (state
subsidies to sectarian institutions of higher education constitutional); Comm. for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792 (1972) (state financial aid to parochial elementary and
secondary schools unconstitutional); Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (local
property tax exemption for religious organizations constitutional); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 242 (1968) '(free loan of public school textbooks to parochial schools consti-
tutional) ; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (release of public school students
during school hours to attend religious instruction or services constitutional).
74 397 U.S. at 669.
75 426 U.S. at 747-48.
76 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (state subsidies to parochial school
teachers teaching secular subjects unconstitutional). See Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 772-773 (1973) (state aid to parents of parochial school children and for
sectarian school buildings unconstitutional) ; Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973.) (state bond
issue to finance construction of educational facilities at sectarian institutions of higher education
constitutional) ; Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1972) (state funded partial tuition reimburse-
ments to parents of parochial school students unconstitutional); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 678 (1971) (federal grants to sectarian institutions of higher education constitu-
tional).
77 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968) (unconstitutional to prohibit by
statute the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools).
78 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (daily Bible reading
ceremony in public schools unconstitutional); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
(Sunday closing law constitutional).
79 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04 (1961) (Sunday closing law constitutional);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (statute requiring official certification
of bona fides of a religious cause before funds can be solicited in its behalf unconstitutional) ;
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1887) (right to free exercise of religion
provides no defense to a criminal prosecution for polygamy).
80 397 U.S. at 671-72.
81 403 U.S. at 612.
82 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (state law providing free bus service
to parochial school students constitutional).
83 Id.; 366 U.S. at 450.
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financial support, and active involvement in religious activity."4 Consequently,
the neutrality doctrine and the three-prong test are also designed to oppose these
infractions of the first amendment.
The three-prong test, then, provides an analytical tool for evaluating the
inevitable relationships between religious organizations and the state. The test
focuses on the form of the relationship to aid in deciphering its substance. Ulti-
mately, however, the nature of the relationship, as determined by the three-prong
test, will resolve whether the statute possesses the required neutrality.
The three-prong test concentrates first on the stated purpose of the legisla-
tion and then on its effect. If either of these factors supports or inhibits religion,
the statute violates the first amendment. An act may pass the first two prongs of
the test, however, and still fail to survive constitutional scrutiny on the basis of en-
tanglement. Initially, the entanglement probe examines the character and
purpose of the benefited or inhibited institutions. Then it considers the nature
of the state's promotion or regulation of religion. Finally, the test inquires into
the relationship between the state and the religious authority."5
The three aspects of the entanglement prong basically probe the nature of a
particular relationship between the state and a religious organization. They
provide an analytical framework in which to assess the state's activity resulting
in the promotion or inhibition of religious exercise. The entanglement inquiry
necessarily looks to the degree of state interaction with religion. It recognizes
that the separation of church and state cannot mean an absence of all contact.
Thus, a "minimal" or "remote" connection causes no first amendment violation.
An "excessive involvement" of activity requiring "official and continual sur-
veillance," however, will not pass constitutional scrutiny. 6
The constitutional consequences of the application of the LMRA to
parochial schools can only be partially analyzed with the three-prong test. Im-
plicitly, the Seventh Circuit in Bishop of Chicago conceded the secular purpose of
the Act, because it never addressed that issue. The court was concerned, how-
ever, with the LMRA's effect on the religious authorities' free exercise of re-
ligion."7 It also stressed the entanglement issues raised by submitting parochial
schools to NLRB jurisdiction. 8 The court's analysis in these two areas, how--
ever, needs to be supplemented.
The LMRA was enacted as a general law with a secular purpose, the pro-
motion of harmonious labor relations. The scope of the Act's jurisdiction is
directed at employers and employees. The LMRA exempts several significant
classes of employers-public employers, railroads, and airlines.8" It also excludes
one significant class of employees-agricultural laborers." Beyond these exemp-
84 397 U.S. at 668.
85 403 U.S. at 615.
86 397 U.S. at 674-75.
87 See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
88 See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
89 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975). Most federal employees have been
granted the right to organize and to bargain collectively by an Executive Order. Exec. Order
No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1969). State employees also have benefited from similar rights
under state labor laws. In addition, the labor relations of railroad and airline employers are
regulated by the Railway Labor Act. 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1970).
90 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975).
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tions, the Act's potential reach extends to all employer/employee relationships
affecting interstate commerce.9 '
In addition, the LMRA focuses narrowly upon the employment relationship.
It affects the discretion of employers only to the extent that it prohibits them
from committing unfair labor practices. These restrictions on the employers'
conduct protect the rights of employees. They do not otherwise directly affect
the employers' managerial discretion.
The LMRA's effect on the academic policies of religious schools thus occurs
indirectly. The constitutionality of this effect, therefore, depends upon whether
incidental burdens on religious exercise by general laws violate the first amend-
ment. In addition, entanglement concerns require a determination whether
NLRB jurisdiction over parochial schools creates an official and continuous re-
lationship between the state and a religious enterprise. These issues raise ad-
ditional questions regarding the extent of civil jurisdiction over ecclesiastical
controversies which dispose of civil disputes. Hence, a complete analysis of the
application of the LMRA to lay teachers must incorporate these considerations
into the three-prong test.
B. The Interaction of the Religion Clauses with Compelling State Interests
The second part of the three-prong test examines the primary effect of the
legislation in question on religious activity. This analysis acknowledges that
there exists a permissible scope of state action that affects the practice of religion.
As long as the primary purpose of the state activity remains secular, incidental
effects upon religious exercise can occur. For this reason, the test's inquiry
focuses only upon the primary effect of the act. Thus, the second prong of the
test depends upon the extent of the constitutionally recognized scope of govern-
ment regulation or encouragement of religious activity.
Basically, the Constitution embodies a dual approach to religion. On the
one hand, neither the inhibition nor the advancement of religion can be com-
pelled by law. On the other, state action cannot interfere with the free exercise
of religion. The protection of society, however, demands that conduct be subject
to regulation. The state's regulation of behavior, nevertheless, cannot unduly
burden the protected freedom.9" Consequently, the freedom to believe remains
absolute but the freedom to act is qualified.
The flag salute cases demonstrate the priority the Supreme Court has placed
on the state's right to enact general laws which infringe incidentally on religious
action. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis,93 a public school's daily flag-
salute ceremony was challenged as contrary to the religious beliefs of two stu-
dents. Looking at the historical development of religious toleration, the Court
91 The NLRB, however, has never exercised its jurisdiction to the fullest extent. The
Board has voluntarily refused to assert jurisdiction over large numbers of employers. In gen-
eral, the NLRB has declined to take cognizance of employers who are not thought to have a
significant effect on commerce. For a discussion of these prudential limitations, see A. Cox,
D. BOK, & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 97-98 (1977).
92 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-0+ (1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303-04 (1940). See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
93 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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upheld the school district's position. It explained that conscientious scruples have
not relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not intended to
promote or restrict religious beliefs.
The Supreme Court could have reversed Gobitis in West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette,4 in which it faced a similar challenge to a public school
flag-salute ceremony. Instead, the Court sustained the challenge but did not
do so on the basis of the religion clauses. It struck down the flag-salute ceremony
as violating the right to freedom of expression.9"
By basing its Barnette holding upon the right to freedom of expression,
the Court left its Gobitis rationale intact. As a result, the primary effect test has
developed to provide the basis for subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The
Court has used the test both by itself and as part of the three-prong test. In
either use two criteria are applied. First, the purpose or effect of the law is
examined. If the act impedes the observance of one or more religions or dis-
criminates invidiously, then the law violates the Constitution. This result follows
even if the effect of the legislation may be characterized as indirect.9 The state,
however, can legitimately exercise its police power to promote health, safety, and
general welfare."7 In so doing, it may enact general laws whose purpose and
effect advance the state's secular goals. These regulations do not violate the Con-
stitution even if they also inflict an incidental burden on religious observance.'
An exception to this principle exists where the slate could accomplish its purpose
by means which do not impose such a burden.99
The second criterion is used only after a legitimate exercise of the police
power has been determined. It involves a balancing test to discover if an excep-
tion to the religion clauses is merited. The balancing process focuses initially on
the interest the state seeks to promote by the statute. Next, the impediment to
those objectives that would result from an exemption claimed under the free exer-
cise clause is considered. Finally, the balancing test requires the state to demon-
strate the adverse effect of such an exemption." 9 To do so, it must show with
particularity how the state's strong interest, as embodied in the statute, would be
unfavorably affected.'
The primary effect test should play a significant part in analyzing whether
the application of the LMRA to parochial schools violates the first amendment.
It will indicate whether the Act falls within the permissible scope of state action
affecting the practice of religion. This finding will furnish the conclusion for
the second part of the three-prong test.
In particular, the primary effect test will characterize the nature of the
94 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
95 Id. at 642.
96 366 U.S. at 607.
97 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (compulsory school attendance laws
held to violate the free exercise right of Amish parents to provide alternative education to
their children).
98 Id. at 220-21; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (unconstitutional to
withhold unemployment compensation from a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused employ-
ment requiring that she work on her Sabbath); 366 U.S. at 607.
99 406 U.S. at 220-21; 366 U.S. at 607.
100 406 U.S. at 221.
101 Id. at 236.
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LMRA's effect on parochial schools. If the Act primarily impedes the school
authorities' free exercise of religion, then its application to parochial schools
infringes on the first amendment. Alternatively, if the LMRA incorporates a
valid exercise of the police power, then it incidentally burdens religious exer-
cise. Absent a less intrusive means to accomplish the Act's purpose, no per se
violation of the religion clause occurs. When no per se violation exists, the
second criterion would weigh the need for an exception to the LMRA for
parochial schools. The outcome of this balancing test would also depend upon
the characterization of the Act's purpose and effect. The parochial schools would
receive an exemption if the interest of the state advanced by the LMRA were not
compelling.
The connection between the Board and religious authorities will come under
further scrutiny in the entanglement analysis. The interaction between the
NLRB and the schools would be limited primarily to the Board's jurisdiction over
alleged unfair labor practices. Its jurisdiction in these matters is restricted by the
same constitutional parameters as those imposed on civil courts. Thus, the three-
prong analysis cannot be completed without an examination of the constitutional
restraints on civil courts in disputes involving ecclesiastical doctrine.
C. Ecclesiastical Disputes and Civil Courts
In general, Supreme Court decisions concerning ecclesiastical doctrine have
involved property disputes between the governing body of a hierarchical church
and a minority faction. Originally, the Court, in Watson v. Jones,' adopted
the common law rule precluding civil courts from deciding ecclesiastical ques-
tions. It, thus, confirmed the decision of the general church's governing body
in the resolution of a property dispute between loyalist and recalcitrant factions.
This narrow decision held that ecclesiastical issues could not be appealed to
civil courts.1"3 Consequently, religious tribunals were fixed as the sole arbiters of
controversies hinging on church doctrine.
The common law principle was broadened in Bouldin v. Alexander. 4 In
this case a local church had removed several of its trustees from office in violation
of general church procedures. The Supreme Court acknowledged the right of the
deposed trustees to obtain judicial relief. It recognized a right to inquire into the
legitimacy of an act of church discipline. Thus, the court affirmed the trial
court's reinstatement of the trustees.'0 5
The principle allowing judicial inquiry into the decisions of ecclesiastical
authorities was more clearly defined in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila.'° ' This case differed from the previous ones because it did not involve
an intrachurch dispute. The petitioner, a layman, claimed a chaplaincy as a
legatee under a will. The Court held that his claim could be sustained only if
he was qualified for the office. It further ruled that only church officials could
102 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
103 Id. at 714.
104 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
105 Id. at 139-40.
106 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
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determine both the qualifications of a chaplain and if a candidate possessed
them."' The Court maintained that the scope of judicial inquiry into matters of
ecclesiastical doctrine was severely limited. The only issues subject to judicial
review, it contended, were "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness."'0 8
More recently, the Supreme Court has integrated a first amendment
rationale into the common law doctrine concerning ecclesiastical disputes. In so
doing, the Court, in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth
Hull Memorial Church,0"' stated the constitutional doctrine of "marginal judicial
involvement." This case involved a property dispute between two local churches
and the general church. The state courts had considered church doctrine as it
had existed at the time of the local churches' affiliation with the general church.
They had compared this doctrine to the church teachings in existence at the
time of the dispute. Based on deviations from the initial teachings, the state
courts had held in favor of the local churches."' The Supreme Court reversed,
ruling that the first amendment prohibited civil courts from resolving ecclesias-
tical disputes."' It held that civil courts could settle controversies involving
religious doctrine only if no interpretation or consideration of the doctrine was
required. The Court noted that one specific exception existed. Civil courts
could participate in the narrow review of a particular ecclesiastical decision
affecting civil rights for fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness." 2
In enunciating this rule, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the first
amendment severely circumscribed the role of civil courts in the resolution of
church property disputes. It argued, however, that not every civil court decision
involving property claimed by an ecclesiastical organization jeopardized the
rights protected in the religion clauses. The Court reasoned that "neutral prin-
ciples of law" developed for use in all property disputes could be applied without
"establishing" religious authorities. It recognized the potential for both inhibition
of the free development of religious doctrine and involvement of secular interests
in purely ecclesiastical matters. The Court maintained, however, that civil
courts could decide religious controversies as long as they did not resolve the
underlying ecclesiastical doctrine." 3 Thus, "marginal judicial involvement"
preserved the ights granted in the religion clauses. It prevented civil courts from
deciding ecclesiastical questions. This doctrine, furthermore, prohibited the
legal sanction of religious authorities deciding doctrinal issues when those de-
cisions were based in fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness.
The doctrine of "marginal judicial involvement," however, was effectively
abandoned by the Supreme Court in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the
United States and Canada v. Milivojevich."4 The Court explicitly held that no
inquiry into the arbitrariness of decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of
107 Id. at 16-17.
108 Id. See also, Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190
(1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
109 393 U.S. 440.
110 Id. at 451-52.
111 Id. at 450-51.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 449.
114 426 U.S. 696 (1975).
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a hierarchical church was allowable."' Thus, it reversed the state supreme
court decision setting aside as arbitrary the findings of a church tribunal in an
intrachurch property dispute. The majority required civil courts to accept the
decisions of religious authorities on matters of discipline, faith, internal organiza-
tion, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law."' It concluded that constitutional
concepts of due process could not be applied to ecclesiastical matters.'"
The dissent in Milivojevich objected that the majority had bound civil
courts to enforcing by law any decree of a church tribunal. This left courts open
to the enforcement of arbitrary lawlessness."' The minority compared religious
organizations to voluntary secular associations and argued that no such deference
was shown to those associations. It concluded that the majority had created
even greater establishment problems in avoiding the free exercise concerns."'
The fact remains, however, that the civil courts lack jurisdiction over ec-
clesiastical issues. This restriction significantly affects the rights guaranteed by
the LMRA when it is applied to parochial schools. The limitation bears most
directly upon the NLRB's ability to hear unfair labor practice allegations. For
example, the Seventh Circuit hypothesized that the discharge of a lay teacher
could raise an issue based on ecclesiastical doctrine. 2 ° The religious basis of the
employer's defense thus would present the NLRB with first amendment considera-
tions. The Milivojevich rule prohibits the Board from hearing the merits of a
doctrinal defense. Alternatively, if the NLRB enforced the decision of an ec-
clesiastical authority without reaching the merits, establishment concerns would
be raised.
The complete lack of civil jurisdiction over ecclesiastical controversies affects
the outcome of the primary effect and entanglement analyses. No definitive
evaluation can be made, however, until the controlling principles of unfair labor
practice law are examined. This body of law reveals how much evidence is re-
quired to support an alleged violation of the LMRA. It further indicates the
amount of evidence needed to refute an alleged unfair labor practice.
V. The Controlling Principles of Unfair Labor Practice Law
The controlling principles of unfair labor practice law are grounded in the
provisions of the LMRA. The Act grants employees specific rights in their
relationship with employers.' The Supreme Court has recognized the right to
organize guaranteed by the LMRA as fundamental. 2 - The Act's protected
activities, however, do not insulate employees from their employer's right to
discipline and discharge them for cause."2 Employers, however, cannot base the
115 Id. at 713.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 714-15.
118 Id. at 727 (Rehnquist, J., Stevens, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 734 (Rehnquist, J., Stevens, J., dissenting).
120 See text accompanying note 69 supra.
121 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975).
122 NLRB v. Jones & McLaughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1936) (NLRA held to be a
valid exercise of Congressional authority as applied to a single plant of a vertically integrated
manufacturer).
123 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970 & Supp. IV. 1975).
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firing and disciplining of workers on antiunion animus."4
Judicial interpretation of the LMRA indicates that the employer's real
motive for its actions is decisive. The Supreme Court has noted that Congress
intended the employer's purpose in discriminating against union activity to be
controlling."' The importance of motive in determining whether an unfair
labor practice has occurred emphasizes the significance of the NLRB hearing.
The Board's examination of an alleged unfair labor practice affords an op-
portunity to discover the facts. On the one hand, the mere suspicion of anti-
union discrimination cannot provide the basis for finding a violation of the
Act. 2 ' On the other, a simultaneously justifiable defense provides no excuse
where union activity furnishes the real motive for disciplinary action.'2 7
Three principles of controlling importance in the fact-finding process have
been identified by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc." s
At one extreme lies the situation in which the employer's discrimination against
employees for their union activity results in the inherent destruction of employee
rights. In this case, no proof of antiunion motivation is needed. The NLRB can
find an unfair labor practice, even though the employer introduces evidence that
its conduct was prompted by business considerations." 9 At the other extreme,
the employer's antiunion discrimination causes a comparatively slight adverse
effect. In this situation, the employee's representative must first establish the
employer's antiunion animation to sustain the charge. The employer must then
come forward with evidence of considerable business justifications for its conduct
to refute a substantiated allegation."' Between these extremes, the employer's
discriminatory conduct adversely affects employee rights to some degree. In this
circumstance, the burden lies with the employer to establish that it was motivated
by legitimate business objectives, because it can more easily obtain access to the
proof."'3
Most unfair labor practice allegations, therefore, require the employer to
establish the lawful business reason for the employee's discharge. Thus, such
124 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975). See NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 537
F.2d 950, 954-55 (7th Cir. 1976) (discharge of employee for acting in reckless disregard of
employer's business.interest upheld); Cannady v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 583, 586 (10th Cir. 1972)
(discipline of employees not motivated by anti-union animus does not violate the LMRA);
Kellwood Co., Ottenheimer Bros. Mfg. Div. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 493, 497-98 (8th Cir. 1969)
(discharge of a union member for poor productivity does not constitute an unfair labor
practice); Corrivea & Routhier Cement Block, Inc. v. NLRB, 410 F.2d 347, 350 (1st Cir.
1969) (discharge of two employees for intimidation of other workers did not violate the
LMRA); NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956) (unfair labor practice to
dismiss one employee to curtail his union activity but no unlawful discrimination in firing
another as part of a reduction of production).
125 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 286-87 '(1965) (use of temporary replacements during
a lockout of employees did not violate the LMRA).
126 NLRB v. Western Bank & Office Supply Co., 283 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1960) (insufficient
evidence to sustain allegation that employee had been wrongfully discharged).
127 Wonder State Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 737, 738 (6th Cir. 1964) (unfair labor
practice to fire a union organizer and a union sympathizer for carelessness in filling orders).
128 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (unfair labor practice for an employer to grant vacation pay only
to those employees not participating in a strike).
129 Id. at 34; NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (employer's offer of
superseniority to striking employees and replacements who work during the strike held inherently
destructive of employee rights).




claims could involve the NLRB in the resolution of an ecclesiastical issue. The
previously noted hypothetical situation involving a heresy defense to an unfair
labor practice allegation would present such a case. The teaching of improper
religious doctrine would constitute a genuine threat to the business interest of
the employer. The controlling principles of labor law would require the school
officials to prove the provisions of canon law defining heresy. In addition, the
employer would need to establish that the teacher's conduct was included in that
definition. Both of these tasks would involve the NLRB in matters of ecclesias-
tical doctrine, a result prohibited by the free exercise clause. The Board, then,
could only avoid the determination of religious doctrine by deferring to the
findings of a religious authority. This position was advocated by the NLRB in
Bishop of Chicago."2 The Seventh Circuit rejected the Board's proposed "ac-
commodation" as an infraction of the establishment clause.133 Thus, the final
component of both primary effect and entanglement analysis depends'upon the
limitations on the NLRB in this situation.
VI. Evaluation of the Lay Teachers' Right to Organize
The foregoing discussion has raised the underlying interests at issue and
the relevant legal principles concerning the application of the LMRA to
parochial schools. The underlying interests in conflict consist of the religious
authorities' control over school policy, the teachers' assertion of the rights granted
in the Act, and the constitutional limitations on state regulation of religious
organizations. An appraisal of these interests must consider them in the context
of the pertinent principles of both constitutional and labor law. The result
will determine whether the LMRA applies to parochial schools.
As previously explained, the format of this analysis must follow the three-
prong test. The first step in this test considers whether or not the LMRA
embodies a secular purpose. No serious doubt exists about the nonecclesiastical
purpose of the Act. The Seventh Circuit, moreover, never disputed the secular
objective of the LMRA."' Thus, the Act survives the first part of the three-
prong test.
A. The Primary Effect of the Application of the LMRA to Parochial Schools
Since the LMRA satisfies the first aspect of the three-prong test, its primary
effect must also be considered. One of the key facts in this analysis concerns the
religious character of the schools. The NLRB held in Bishop of Chicago that the
schools were religiously associated.' By this classification the Board acknowl-
edged that the purpose of the schools embraced both religious and secular educa-
tion. The Seventh Circuit criticized the NLRB's standard as being too simplistic
132 559 F.2d at 1128.
133 Id.
134 The Seventh Circuit did not specifically consider the purpose of the LMRA. In dis-
cussing the inhibiting effect of a bargaining order, it maintained that the policy considerations
underlying the Act were sound. 559 F.2d at 1124. Presumably, the court believed that the
Act contained a secular purpose.
135 220 N.L.R.B. at 359.
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and made its own characterization of the religious nature of the schools.'36 The
court did not base its assessment upon the facts stated in the record. Instead, it
relied entirely upon the Supreme Court's description of the parochial schools in
the parochaid cases as "religious pervasive institutions.""' 7 The court did so
despite the fact that Bishop of Chicago involved neither state aid to parochial
schools nor the parochaid schools. The Seventh Circuit particularly stressed the
Supreme Court's characterization of the schools in Lemon v. Kurtzman."8
Ironically, that opinion also disregarded the record before the Court. The
Lemon majority maintained that in parochial schools "the teaching process
is, to a large extent, devoted to the inculcation of religious values and beliefs."' 39
This contention ignored the factual findings of the district court "that religious
values did not necessarily affect the content of secular instruction."'"4  The
Seventh Circuit, like the Lemon majority, incorporated extrinsic facts about the
nature of parochial schools into its opinion. In both cases, these facts were
designed to substantiate the formulation of a particular policy. Thus, the court's
primary effect analysis was influenced largely by its adoption of facts extraneous
to the case.
The primary effect analysis is also used to evaluate the effect of faculty
unionization on parochial school policymaking. The NLRB in Bishop of
Chicago conceded that lay teacher collective bargaining would restrict the em-
ployer's unbridled exercise of administrative prerogative. The school officials
would be forced to negotiate the employment conditions with the lay faculty's
representative. This negotiation would initiate a sharing of decision-making
where previously none had formally existed.' 4' The Seventh Circuit seized upon
the Board's narrow concession as an opportunity to introduce more facts from
outside the record. These facts did not relate directly to the particular parties to
the litigation but instead were of a general nature. The court relied upon a
commentary by Professor Ralph Brown to establish these facts. 42 The article
maintained that faculty unionization in higher education generally results in the
transformation of academic policy to employment conditions. 43 The Seventh
Circuit then asserted that further research had empirically proved Brown's
thesis."'
The record in Bishop of Chicago did not establish to what degree the
lay faculty was already consulted when school officials made academic policy
decisions. It contained no facts regarding the union's contractual proposals
affecting administrative policymaking. Additionally, the record did not contain
existing contractual provisions concerning school policies from currently union-
136 559 F.2d at 1118.
137 Id. at 1120-22.
138 Id. at 1121.
139 403 U.S. at 618.
140 Id. at 667 (White, J., dissenting). See 403 U.S. at 618.
141 559 F.2d at 1123.
142 Id.
143 Brown, Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1067, 1075
(1969).
144 559 F.2d at 1123 (citing Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 60, 80 (1973)).
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ized parochial schools. More recent and extensive research, moreover, has
defined distinguishable limits to Professor Brown's thesis,14 thus disputing the
"factual" basis of the court's opinion in Bishop of Chicago.
When facts outside the record are incorporated into the primary effect
analysis, as in Bishop of Chicago, the investigation loses its relevancy to the case.
By focusing on the constitutional rights in issue, the examination also obscures the
importance of the competing interests in the case. The primary effect analysis
fails to consider the interests of lay teachers in the parochial schools. As the
number of lay faculty has grown,'46 the importance of this interest has increased.
Generally, the working conditions in parochial schools lag significantly
behind those in public schools. The student-faculty ratio greatly exceeds that of
public schools. Teachers are paid salaries well below parity with their public
school counterparts. They, furthermore, are rarely provided with retirement
plans and tenured positions.'47 Despite the dissimilarities in working conditions,
lay teachers perform substantially the same tasks as public school teachers.
If the lay teachers are denied collective bargaining rights, their ability to
alter these conditions will remain slim. The superior bargaining position of
parochial school authorities allows them to exploit the overcrowded labor market
for teachers. Without either a faculty union to assert the lay teachers' interests or
the fear of a faculty's unionization, school officials lack an incentive to respond
to the teachers' demands. The school authorities, therefore, offer employment on
unnegotiable terms. This situation victimizes the lay teachers.
The nonapplication of the LMRA to parochial school teachers, furthermore,
denies them rights granted to most other elementary and secondary school
teachers. Currently, public school teachers in thirty-three states have the statutory
right to organize. 4 ' In addition, teachers at private schools with no religious
affiliation are included within the scope of the Act.'49 Admittedly, no per se right
145 Later studies indicate that faculty unionization creates a difference in tenor rather than
substance regarding the faculty contribution to administrative policymaking. The faculty's
voice in college and university governance has remained within the bounds set by the informal,
traditional procedure. Thus, unionization has tended to replace existing informal procedures
for consultation with formal, explicit contractual rights. Collective bargaining increased the
professors' influence in only one circumstance. This occurred where prior procedures did not
allow for informal faculty consultation consistent with that traditionally found at major
universities. J. GARERINO with B. AUSSIEKER, FACULTY BARGAINING 255-56 (1975). Un-
questionably, lay teachers can be expected to bargain collectively for a role in academic
policymaking. Elementary and secondary school administrators, however, have differed from
their college and university counterparts. They have never consulted their faculty to the same
extent concerning matters of school policy. By analogy, then, the lay faculty will most likely
demand contractual rights consistent with the traditional, informal consultation of teachers
found in major school systems. Thus, the contractual rights affecting school policymaking
sought by lay teachers would differ significantly from those sought by college professors.
146 M. LARSON, WHEN PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS CLOSE 247-48 (1972).
147 Id. at 244-46.
148 The LMRA specifically exempts governmental employees, including public school
teachers, from its scope in § 2(2). 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975). Many
states, however, provide public school faculty members with a statutory right to organize in-
cluding: Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, The District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Other states, such as Illinois, allow public school teachers to
organize without a specific statute granting the right. The right to unionize in these states is
derived from the federal Constitution's protection of associational rights.
149 See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
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to the protections of the LMRA exists. The denial of its benefits, however, in
effect allows the continued exploitation of lay teachers by parochial school
officials. The Act, moreover, was enacted to prevent employers from taking
advantage of the inferior bargaining position of their employees. Thus, the
purpose of the Act makes the lay teacher's bargaining rights a state interest.
The primary effect of the LMRA on the school authorities' right to free
exercise of religion needs further consideration. The unsettled question that
remains concerns the amount of infringement on that right the Act causes. The
full extent of this burden can be assessed only by examining issues pertinent to en-
tanglement. These issues concern the nature of the relationship between the
religious authorities and the NLRB which the application of the LMRA to
parochial schools would impose.
B. Entanglement
Entanglement investigation performs a dual task. Primarily, it strives to
resolve whether a given tie between the state and a religious organization violates
the establishment clause. Additionally, the investigation weighs factors which
bear upon the primary effect of the legislation creating the relationship. Thus
the entanglement inquiry examines considerations important in determining
whether the application of the LMRA to parochial schools infringes on the
religion clauses.
The Supreme Court's holdings have not demanded the complete separation
of church and state. They have recognized that some relationship between both
government and religious entities must inevitably occur. 5 ' The permissible
scope of governmental activity affecting religious organizations generally includes
legislation enacted under authority of the state's police power.15" ' In Lemon v.
Kurtzman, the majority opinion stated that "fire inspections, building and
zoning regulations, and state requirements under compulsory school-attendance
laws ... [constituted] necessary and permissible contacts."' 52
Compulsory attendance laws falling within the Lemon Court's category
of "necessary and permissible contacts" usually impose restrictions on nonpublic
school curricula. The judiciary has recognized the legitimate exercise of the
states' police power in the regulating and licensing of parochial schools." 3 An
150 403 U.S. at 614.
151 King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996
(1975) (constitution held not to oblige FCC to relinquish its regulatory mandate so that
religious sects may merge their licensed franchises completely into their ecclesiastical struc-
tures); Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 1013 (1954) (Fair Labor Standards Act held applicable to a corporation organized for
religious purpose).
152 403 U.S. at 614.
153 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), provides the core of American
jurisprudence relating to the state regulation of private and parochial schools. The Supreme
Court in Pierce held a mandatory attendance law requiring all children affected by it to
attend public schools unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the state could not compel
children to attend public schools, but it could regulate nonpublic schools:
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require
that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good
moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to
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examination of a typical state school code indicates the extent of permissible
state action limiting the discretion of parochial school authorities. Since one of
the petitioners in Bishop of Chicago operated schools in Illinois, its School Code5
has been selected for this purpose.
The Illinois School Code indirectly fashions the substance of nonpublic
school curricula. Its compulsory attendance law requires all children between
the ages of seven and sixteen to attend public schools. An exemption to the
provision allows these children to fulfill the statute's requirement in private and
parochial schools. To qualify their pupils for the exemptions, nonpublic schools
must provide students with "the branches of education taught to children of
corresponding age and grade in the public schools.""' The Code further provides
that the curriculum of the public schools shall be determined by the local school
boards.' Through the compulsory attendance law, therefore, the state compels
nonpublic schools to adhere to its standards and regulations and to the local
school board's curriculum.
The School Code requires that instruction be performed in the English
language;"' it also compels public schools and thus by implication private and
parochial schools to offer specific courses. For example, the curriculum of grades
seven through twelve must include a course in "American patriotism and the
principles of representative government." Not less than one hour per week,
furthermore, must be devoted to this subject." 8 The Code also calls for instruc-
tion in the following areas: health," 9 physical education,' consumer educa-
tion,' conservation of natural resources,"6 2 safety,G3 and United States His-
164tory.
T
The reach of state regulation significantly affects the curriculum of the
parochial schools. This variety of "necessary and permissible contact" concerns
matters which pertain to rights under both religion clauses. The indirect state
regulation of the content of parochial school curricula limits the free exercise
rights of the religious authorities. Nonpublic schools either offer a course of study
similar in content to that of the public schools, or their students are not exempted
from the compulsory attendance law. This curriculum constraint inflicts a sub-
stantial burden on the operation of parochial schools. At a minimum, they must
commit large amounts of time and resources to the teaching of a curriculum
good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly
inimical to the public welfare.
Id. at 534. See 392 U.S. at 245-48. See also Sante Fe Community School v. New Mexico
State Bd. of Educ., 85 N.M. 783, 518 P.2d 783 (1974) (requirements of compulsory attendance
law held applicable to a private school); Packer Collegiate Inst. v. Univ. of State of New
York, 273 App. Div. 203, 76 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1948), reu'd on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 184, 81
N.E.2d 80 (1948).
154 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 1-1 to 1214 (Smith-Hurd) (1961 & Supp. 1978).
155 Id. at § 26-1(1).
156 Id. at § 27-1.
157 Id. at § 26-1(1).
158 Id. at §§ 27-3, 27-4.
159 Id. at § 27-5.
160 Id. at §§ 27-5, 27-6.
161 Id. at § 27-12.1.
162 Id. at § 27-13.1.
163 Id. at § 27-17.
164 Id. at § 27-21.
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dictated by the legislature and local public school board. Thus, compliance with
the Code reduces the amount of time and resources available for religious instruc-
tion.
Beyond its free exercise implications, the Code also threatens the rights
protected by the establishment clause. The School Code empowers the Super-
intendent of Public Instruction to inspect the facilities of nonpublic schools.'65
The Code also compels private and parochial schools to keep records and to
submit reports periodically to the Superintendent. 6' The Superintendent gathers
this information to advise the General Assembly and the Governor of nonpublic
school conditions and the educational resources of the state. 7 The School Code
further requires nonpublic schools to retain cumulative records of student physical
examinations.' These sorts of tasks require the existence of an official and
continual relationship between religious authorities and the state. Ordinarily, an
entanglement inquiry would find this kind of relationship an infringement upon
the establishment clause. The state interest in the regulation of education, then,
must outweigh the burden on first amendment rights. This characterization of
the state regulation of parochial schools prevents a successful constitutional chal-
lenge.
Compulsory attendance laws, therefore, compel parochial schools to under-
take significant obligations. The application of the LMRA, however, does not
impose similar responsibilities. The NLRB has previously asserted jurisdiction
over parochial schools in Baltimore and Los Angeles. 9 These schools have not
challenged the constitutionality of the LMRA since the faculty gained the right
to bargain collectively. The current operation of parochial schools with unionized
faculties indicates that teacher unions do not destroy the religious purpose of
the schools. The continued existence of these unionized schools implies that the
religious officials running them have not been deprived of their control over the
curriculum.
The LMRA, moreover, requires no prolonged relationship between the state
and a religious organization. The Act's effect on parochial school curricula
depends upon union demands. The NLRB does not interact with an employer
until an alleged violation of the LMRA has been raised.17 The Board's jurisdic-
tion extends no further than the regulation of employer-employee relations as
defined by the LMRA."' As an administrative agency of the executive branch,
the NLRB's remedial powers do not embrace the whole range of legal and
equitable remedies. It may issue cease and desist orders to enjoin unfair labor
practices. The Board further may require unlawfully discharged employees to be
reinstated with or without compensation for their forced absence from work.
165 Id. at § 2-3.10.
166 Id. at §§ 2-3.10, 2-3.23.
167 Id. at § 2-3.211.
168 Id. at § 27.8.
169 See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra. See also Nazareth Regional High School v.
NLRB, 549 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1977) (court ruled that the failure of the administration of a
private religious high school that had replaced the prior diocesan school administration to
bargain with the existing faculty union constituted an unfair labor practice; no constitutional
issue was raised).
170 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160 (1970 & Supp. IV 1975).
171 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157, 158, 159, 160 (1970 & Supp. IV 1975).
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Finally, the NLRB may require a violator to file periodic reports to demonstrate
its compliance with the Board's order. 17 2 Thus, the LMRA focuses very narrowly
on labor relations. Its effects and remedies influence the parochial school author-
ities' discretion much less than does the broad impact of compulsory attendance
laws.
The NLRB's assertion of jurisdiction, moreover, extends to lay teachers only.
Since no members of a religious order are included, the basis of its jurisdiction
remains the contractual relationship between employer and employee. This fact
deserves attention, because the commercial activity of parochial schools does not
differ from that of other voluntary commercial organizations. They make
contracts in the course of their operations. Disputes arising out of these agree-
ments fall within the jurisdiction of civil authorities. In enacting the LMRA,
furthermore, Congress did not grant an exemption from the Act's jurisdiction
to religious organizations. As previously discussed, however, a civil court cannot
decide ecclesiastical issues; therefore, neither can the NLRB. Thus, the LMRA
operates in a manner quite similar to other laws affecting the commercial activity
of the parochial schools.
The involvement of the NLRB in the labor relations of parochial schools,
however, raises entanglement considerations. The heretic teacher hypothetical
from Bishop of Chicago provides a concrete example. Parochial school author-
ities, like other employers, can protect their business interests by firing a teacher
for cause. Since the school's purpose lies in education consistent with certain
religious principles, heresy threatens to impair the employer's commercial wel-
fare. A discharged lay teacher must establish a prima facie violation of the
LMRA to pursue an unfair labor practice allegation against the school. Thus,
the teacher must show that the school authorities acted out of antiunion motiva-
tion.
The Milivojevich17 1 principle, however, prohibits the NLRB from deciding
the merits of the employer's heresy defense. Rather, it requires the Board to
accept the decisions of religious authorities regarding an ecclesiastical issue, such
as heresy. This limited acquiescence by the NLRB does not deprive the Board
of its entire jurisdiction over parochial schools. It removes from the NLRB only
the resolution of disputes based on church doctrine. In addition, the lay teachers
would secure the rights to unionize and to bargain collectively. This limitation
on the Board, however, leaves room for substantial abuse by the religious
authorities. They could effectively circumvent the enforcement of most unfair
labor practice provisions174 with justifications based entirely on ecclesiastical
doctrine. The substantial circumvention of these rights would considerably
impair the exercise of the other rights granted by the LMRA.
A better formulation of NLRB jurisdiction over the parochial schools would
limit the Milivojevich rule to situations closer to its own facts, that is, to cases
involving intrachurch disputes. In Milivojevich, the relationship between the
parties was defined by the principles of canon law governing the ecclesiastical
172 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975).
173 See text accompanying notes 114-17 supra.
174 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975).
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hierarchy. The resolution of the property dispute rested ultimately upon the
church law concerning a bishop's bond to the mother church. Canon law, how-
ever, does not provide the foundation of the relationship between lay teachers
and parochial schools. The terms of the employment contract determine this
basis. Thus, civil law controls the employment agreement and disputes arising
out of it.
In a situation like the heretic-teacher hypothetical, the disposition of an
ecclesiastical issue resolves the dispute. Under these circumstances, the NLRB
should be permitted to review a church tribunal's findings on the ecclesiastical
issue. This civil review would be strictly limited to the narrow issues of fraud,
collusion, or procedural arbitrariness. In the case of a heretic-teacher, the Board
still would not be allowed to hear the merits of the school officials' heresy
defense. It could review only whether, in fact, the proper ecclesiastical pro-
cedures had been followed to hold the teacher a heretic. Assume, for example,
that canon law required a diocesan chancery office to determine the merits of all
heresy allegations. School officials could assert a heresy defense to an unfair
labor practice allegation in just one situation. This condition would exist only
if they had received the chancery office's opinion affirming the teacher's heresy
prior to firing him. This sort of inquiry would not require the NLRB to
determine matters of church doctrine. It would, however, substantially reduce
the potential abuse of ecclesiastically based defenses to unfair labor practices
possible under the Milivojevich doctrine.
This formulation would reinstate the constitutional rule stated in Hull' but
only insofar as nonintrachurch disputes were involved, thereby affording the
"neutrality" which the establishment clause seeks to preserve. The state's inter-
vention into the ecclesiastical controversies would be narrowly defined. It would,
nonetheless, guard against the establishment of lawlessness by ecclesiastical fiat
which can result by default under Milivojevich. The principle that the Supreme
Court sought to preserve in that case would not be affected. Intrachurch dis-
putes would continue to be governed by the decision of the ecclesiastical
hierarchy.
The relationship of the NLRB to parochial schools, then, does not involve
either continual and official surveillance or intervention in ecclesiastical doctrine.
Thus, the LMRA only minimally affects the school officials' decision-making.
Empirical evidence indicates that faculty unionization merely formalizes the
traditionally existing informal joint faculty-administration policymaking pro-
cedures.17 In addition, the experience of parochial schools with unionized
faculties has not resulted in constitutional challenges to the Act. Thus, the
LMRA survives the three-part analysis of the entanglement inquiry.
The completion of the entanglement analysis provides the information
needed to complete the primary effect test. It revealed that the LMRA exerts
only a minimal incidental restraint upon the free exercise rights of the school
authorities. Thus, the LMRA also survives the primary effect analysis.
175 See text accompanying notes 109-13 supra.




A. Results of the Religion Clauses Scrutiny
The evaluation of the application of the LMRA to parochial schools, there-
fore, demonstrates that the Act withstands the first amendment challenge. This
evaluation has incorporated all three areas of analysis concerned with the
religion clauses. In effect, the compelling state interest doctrine and the rule that
civil courts will not intervene in ecclesiastical issues have been incorporated into
the three-prong test. No one of these analytical methods could assess fully the
constitutionality of NLRB jurisdiction over parochial schools.
The results of this combined analysis conflict with those of the Seventh
Circuit in Bishop of Chicago.1 77 The difference between this appraisal and that
of the court lies chiefly in factual considerations. For instance, the Seventh
Circuit disregarded the NLRB's findings concerning the religious nature of the
schools. Instead, it adopted facts extraneous to the record. These facts involved
the nature of the schools and the effect of faculty unionization on the school
authorities' decision-making. The appropriateness of these facts, however, was
never tested by the rigors of the adversary process. The cases relied upon by the
court to establish the religious nature of the schools dealt with both schools and
issues different from those involved in Bishop of Chicago. The empirical re-
search concerning faculty unionization suffered from similar defects. The re-
search considered only colleges and universities; moreover, its results have been
qualified by subsequent research. The Seventh Circuit neglected these significant
factors in basing its decision on these extra-record facts. The court, furthermore,
did not compare the pervasive effect of other constitutional exercises of the
police power affecting parochial schools, such as compulsory school attendance
laws, with that of the LMRA. It also did not recognize the limited jurisdiction
and remedial power of the NLRB. The Seventh Circuit further failed to
acknowledge the contractual basis of the relationship between lay teachers and
the parochial school administration. At the very least, the conclusion of the
court was not based sufficiently on the facts in the record. The combined re-
ligion clauses analysis, therefore, indicates that the Seventh Circuit decided the
issue wrongly.
B. The LMRA as Tempered by the Religion Clauses
The court's decision in Bishop of Chicago, thus, failed to recognize how the
religion clauses temper the LMRA's impact on parochial schools. The way in
which the Act's application respects the interests of the school authorities, lay
teachers, and the Constitution reflects this tempering of the LMRA's effect.
First, the Act does not interfere with the school authorities' free exercise of
religion. Since the Act embodies an important state interest, some incidental
burden can constitutionally occur. The present operation of the LMRA in
177 This conclusion also disagrees with that of the court in Caulfield v. Hirsh, 95 L.R.R.M.
3164 (1977).
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parochial schools indicates that the actual burden incurred is not constitutionally
impermissible. Second, the Act grants the lay teachers specific protections in
dealings with their employers. These protections will prevent the victimization
of the teachers in labor relations with the school authorities. Third, the con-
stitutional principles of the first amendment are not impaired by the application
of the LMRA to parochial schools. Beyond respecting the free exercise rights of
the school authorities, the Act complies with the establishment clause, because
NLRB inquiries cannot consider ecclesiastical questions. This limitation on
Board jurisdiction merely comports it with the same restriction placed on civil
courts. Thus, the important national policy embodied in the LMRA can be
applied to parochial schools without jeopardizing the rights guaranteed by the
religion clauses.
-Gerald M. Richardson
